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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Malcolm Cornelius Mack challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Idaho State Police Corporal Cottrell stopped a vehicle on Interstate 84 in Canyon County
for excessive window tint and following too closely. (R., p.13.) The occupants of the vehicle
were the driver, Oscar Leon Caldwell, and the passenger, Mack. (R., p.13.) Cottrell called in
their information to dispatch and, while waiting on a return, conducted a drug dog sniff of the
vehicle. (R., p.13.) The dog alerted to the odor of drugs in the vehicle. (R., p.13.) A search of
the vehicle revealed over four pounds of marijuana and over five thousand dollars in cash in the
trunk. (R., p.13.) Mack told law enforcement that the drugs belonged to him. (R., p.13.)
Cottrell arrested Mack and let Caldwell go without issuing any traffic citations. (R., p.14.) The
state charged Mack with trafficking in marijuana. (R., pp.37-38.)
Mack moved to suppress evidence, including the statements he made and contraband
seized, asserting a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution. 1 (R., pp.59-87.) Mack argued that Cottrell unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop by
conducting the drug dog sniff of the vehicle. 2 (R., pp.72-82.) The state disputed that the sniff
prolonged the stop, since it occurred while Cottrell was waiting for dispatch to respond with a
return on Caldwell and Mack’s information. (R., pp.97-98.) The state argued that even if the

1

Mack also asserted a violation of his rights under Article 9, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution;
however, he made no argument specific to the Idaho Constitution.
2
Mack also argued that the search of the trunk was improper where the drug dog alerted to the
front passenger side of the vehicle. (R., pp. 82-85.) Mack does not renew this argument on
appeal.
1

stop was extended, the extension was lawful because Cottrell had independent reasonable,
articulable suspicion to support conducting the drug dog sniff. (R., pp.98-100.)
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress, at which Officer Cottrell
testified and his dash cam video was admitted, along with Mack’s affidavit in support of his
motion. (R., pp.61-64, 110; see Ex. 3) Cottrell testified that he has fourteen years of law
enforcement experience, that he is an instructor on drug interdiction and assigned to an
interdiction team. (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-19; p.6, Ls.12-14; R., p.118.) He has investigated over 600
cases involving controlled substances found in a vehicle. (Tr., p.14, L.1 – p.15, L.5.) Interstate
84 in Canyon County is a high intensity drug trafficking area (HIDTA)—a federal label given to
areas noted for drug trafficking and apprehension. (Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.7, L.3; R., p.119 n.5.)
On June 27, 2018, Cottrell was on duty and noticed a vehicle with excessively dark
window tint that was following too closely behind a semi-truck on Interstate 84. (Tr., p.7, Ls.815; R., p.110.) Cottrell conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle. (Tr., p.7, Ls.17-18; Ex., 0:300:50; R., p.110.) The vehicle had Alaska license plates. (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-22; R., p.110.) The
driver, Caldwell, identified himself with an Arkansas driver’s license. (Tr., p.8, Ls.15-18; p.16,
Ls.23-25; R., pp.110-11.) When Caldwell produced his driver’s license, Cottrell noticed a large
wad of cash in his wallet. (Tr., p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.2; R., p.111.) Cottrell told Caldwell the
reasons for the stop and Caldwell agreed that he was following too closely. (Tr., p.10, Ls.9-17;
Ex., 1:10-1:45; 3:33-4:30; R., p.111.)
Caldwell said that he had flown from Arkansas to Washington state to drive the vehicle

3

Citations to “Ex.” refer to the dash cam video.
2

back to Arkansas, and that the vehicle belonged to his brother. (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-21; Ex., 1:153:30; R., p.111.) Cottrell testified that Caldwell seemed evasive. (Tr., p.9, L.1.) Cottrell also
testified that Mack seemed nervous: he engaged Cottrell in conversation, asked how his day was,
and offered to provide his identification. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-8; Ex., 4:30; R., p.111.) Cottrell
identified Mack using his Arkansas identification card. (Tr., p.9, Ls.20-25; R., p.111.) Mack
stated he recently moved to Tacoma, Washington. (Tr., p.13, Ls.18-21; R., p.111.)
Cottrell asked for the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance. (Ex., 1:25; R., p.
111.) Caldwell had trouble locating the current documents; with Cottrell’s permission he exited
the vehicle and found the documents in the front passenger side. (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-17; Ex., 5:407:50; R., p.111.) Cottrell saw a large suitcase with an airline luggage tag was in the back seat of
the vehicle. (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-5; R., p.110.) Cottrell observed vent clip air fresheners in every vent
in the front of the vehicle, and smelled a strong odor coming from the air fresheners. (Tr., p.12,
Ls.18-21; R., p.110.)
After he had the documents in hand, Cottrell spoke to Caldwell behind the vehicle. (Ex.,
7:57-9:07.) Cottrell asked Caldwell to estimate how closely he was following the semi-truck and
Caldwell admitted he was too close; Cottrell also discussed the window tint on the vehicle. (Tr.,
p.10, Ls.9-17; Ex., 8:00-8:19; R., pp.111-12.) Cottrell asked if there was anything he needed to
be concerned with in the vehicle, any weapons or drugs, and whether Caldwell was asked to
transport anything besides the vehicle across state lines; Caldwell said no. (Tr., p.13, Ls.3-7; Ex.,
8:20-8:31; R., p.112.) Cottrell asked about the air fresheners in the vehicle and Caldwell
explained that the vehicle had been “sitting up.” (Tr., p.12, L.22 – p.13, L.2; Ex., 8:32-8:54; R.,
p.112.) Cottrell asked if there was anything he needed to be concerned with in the trunk, told
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Caldwell he had a drug dog with him, and asked if the dog would alert to drugs in the vehicle;
Caldwell again indicated no. (Tr., p. 13, Ls.7-12; Ex., 8:55-9:07; R., p.112.)
Cottrell returned to his vehicle to run a driver’s check “but was told to stand by by
dispatch because of an emergency occurring right then.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.13-18; Ex., 9:25-10:00;
R., p.112.) While he waited, Cottrell checked the window tint on the vehicle. (Tr., p.11, Ls.1921; Ex., 10:30-11:35; R., p.112.) He then returned to his car, at which time dispatch was able to
receive his driver’s check, and provided dispatch with Caldwell and Mack’s information. (Tr.,
p.11, Ls.21-23; Ex., 11:45-13:33; R., p.112.) Cottrell told dispatch he would be on canine
deployment and proceeded to conduct a dog sniff of the vehicle. (Ex., 13:35-14:40; R., p.112.)
The drug dog alerted at the front passenger window. (Tr., p.20, L.25 – p.21, L.2; Ex., 14:30; R.,
p.112.) Cottrell “had not received a return from dispatch when the dog was deployed and gave
an active alert indication.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-9; R., p.112.) Cottrell searched the vehicle and found
in the trunk $5,200 dollars in cash and over four pounds of marijuana. (Tr., p.21, Ls.9-15; Ex.,
21:30; R., p.112.)
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court issued a written order denying
Mack’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.110-21.) The district court determined that Cottrell did not
extend the stop when he ran the drug dog. (R., p.117.) The district court found that Cottrell
performed an exterior sniff of the vehicle “[w]hile he was waiting on a return from dispatch.” 4

4

The district court also found: “After the sniff was complete, the officer took [the drug dog] back
to his patrol car and checked on the status of the return from dispatch. Dispatch had completed
the return. The car registration was accurate and neither occupant was ‘wanted’ by law
enforcement.” (R., p.112.) Mack contests this finding, asserting that “there is no video evidence
or testimony showing Officer Cottrell asked dispatch about a return of the license and warrants
checks, or that dispatch had ever returned such results to the officer.” (Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
On the video, radio communication can be heard after the dog alert, but due to the sound quality,
the state cannot make out what is being said. (See Ex., 15:10-15:45.) However, the video shows
4

(R., p.112.) Thus, “[t]he officer did not abandon the original purpose of the stop and he
performed the canine sniff without adding time to the stop.” (R., p.117.) Alternatively, the
district court determined that Cottrell developed reasonable suspicion that illegal drugs were in
the vehicle. (R., pp.118-20.) Specifically, the district court found:
Before the driver provided his current registration, the officer knew or learned
that: a third party owned the vehicle; the occupants had Arkansas licenses and
were transporting a vehicle with Alaska plates from Washington (a “source” state)
to Arkansas; luggage was in the backseat with an airline tag; one or both
occupants took a one-way flight; the driver advised that he had the registration in
hand earlier that morning; there were air fresheners attached to each air vent,
emitting a very strong odor; the driver had a large billfold of cash in his wallet;
the location of the stop in a federally-designated “High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area” (HIDTA); the officer’s belief that the driver was being evasive; and the
Defendant’s apparent nervousness.
(R., p.119 (footnotes omitted).) These facts, “based on [Cottrell’s] knowledge, training, and
experience, gave him reasonable suspicion” to justify his investigation into drug activity. (R.,
pp.118-19.) Therefore, the district court denied Mack’s motion to suppress. (R., p.121.)
Mack entered a conditional guilty plea to an amended charge of possession with intent to
deliver, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. (See R.,
pp.127-44.) Mack was sentenced to a suspended term of five years, with three years fixed, and
placed on supervised probation. (R., p.145.) Mack filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.15456, 164-68.)

that Cottrell called in to dispatch after the positive alert: “Control 633, were you able to copy?”
(Ex., 15:45.) Dispatch responds, “I have their information, I’ll run that now.” (Ex., 15:50.)
Cottrell then asks that dispatch log the positive alert and send another unit to the scene. (Ex.,
15:58.)
5

ISSUE
Mack states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Mack’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Mack failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress?

6

ARGUMENT
Mack Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mack argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. First,

Mack argues that Cottrell unlawfully extended the traffic stop when he asked Caldwell questions
about drugs and again when he conducted the dog sniff. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-16.) Because
Mack did not challenge Cottrell’s questions at the district court level, that claim is not preserved
for appeal. Even if it were, Cottrell did not abandon the traffic stop when he briefly asked
Caldwell general unrelated questions. Additionally, Cottrell did not prolong the stop when he
conducted the drug dog sniff because he was waiting on a return from dispatch; therefore, the
dog sniff did not add time to the length of the stop.
Mack next argues that the district court erred when it found, in the alternative, that any
extension was justified by reasonable suspicion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-25.) The district court
properly concluded that any extension was supported by reasonable suspicion based on the
specific, articulable facts known to Cottrell at the time. Cottrell observed that the vehicle had
Alaska plates, was being driven from Washington (a source state) to Arkansas through a high
drug activity corridor, the vehicle occupants had out-of-state identifications, neither occupant
owned the vehicle, Caldwell said he’s had the vehicle’s documents in hand earlier that day, Mack
had recently moved to Washington but was already travelling back to Arkansas, Caldwell had a
large wad of cash in his wallet, every vent in the vehicle had an air freshener which emanated a
strong odor, luggage bearing an airline tag was in the backseat instead of the trunk, and the
occupants seemed evasive or nervous.

These facts were sufficient to create reasonable,

7

articulable suspicion that drug activity was afoot and justify Cottrell’s questions and the dog
sniff. The district court did not err when it denied Mack’s motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to those facts. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). “At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Pieper, 163
Idaho 732, 734, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Mack’s Motion To Suppress
1.

Mack Has Failed To Show That Cottrell Unlawfully Prolonged The Traffic Stop

“Traffic stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007). “Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a
vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” 5 State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, ___, 458
P.3d 220, 223 (Ct. App. 2019). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho
585, 588, 416 P.3d 957, 960 (2018) (internal quotation omitted).

5

Mack does not challenge the constitutionality of the initial traffic stop.
8

An investigatory detention must be temporary and “last no longer than necessary to
effectuate” the purpose of the stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). See
also State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ct. App. 2008). “The stop
remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop, to which
that reasonable suspicion is related. However, should the officer abandon the purpose of the
stop, the officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions.” State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
Although officers cannot abandon a traffic stop to pursue a drug investigation without
reasonable suspicion, “[c]ounting every pause taken…as conduct that unlawfully adds time to the
stop is inimical to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and is contrary to United
States Supreme Court precedent.” State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736, 741, 418 P.3d 1245, 1250
(Ct. App. 2018). “Rodriguez does not prohibit all conduct that in any way slows the officer from
completing the stop as fast as humanly possible. It prohibits abandoning the stop to investigate
other crimes.” Still, 166 Idaho at ___, 458 P.3d at 225.

a.

Mack’s Claim That Cottrell Unlawfully Prolonged The Traffic Stop By
Questioning Caldwell Is Unpreserved And Fails On The Merits

Mack claims that Cottrell unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop when he questioned
Caldwell about whether there were drugs in the vehicle. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-14.) This
claim is unpreserved. It was not raised before the district court, and is therefore not properly
before this Court on appeal. Nonetheless, the claim fails on the merits because Cottrell’s general
questioning was not an abandonment of the purpose of the traffic stop.

9

i.

This Claim Was Not Raised Below And Is Thus Unpreserved For Appeal

“Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties
will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower court.” State v. GarciaRodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (quoting Heckman Ranches, Inc. v.
State, By & Through Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799-800, 589 P.2d 540, 546-47 (1979)).
This Court requires “both the issue and the party’s position on the issue [to] be raised before the
trial court for it to be properly preserved for appeal.” State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 672, 450
P.3d 315, 320 (2019). “We will not hold that a trial court erred in making a decision on an issue
or a party’s position on an issue that it did not have the opportunity to address.” State v.
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). “A groomed horse is expected on appeal,
but a different horse is forbidden.” Id.
Before the district court, Mack asserted that the drug dog sniff unlawfully extended the
traffic stop. (See R., pp.59-86.) He did not also assert that the traffic stop was unlawfully
extended by Cottrell’s questioning of Caldwell. Rather, the issue before the district court was
framed, argued, and analyzed consistently as being about the constitutionality of the dog sniff.
(See R., pp.86 (“Thus the drug dog search, followed by the search of the inside of the vehicle,
was unlawful and unconstitutional.”), 95 (“[T]he Defendant asserts that Corporal Chris Cottrell
improperly extended the stop…by having his canine dug detection partner Dax perform an
exterior sniff of the vehicle.”), 113 (“[Mack] argues that Cpl. Cottrell abandoned the purpose of
the stop, or unlawfully extended the stop to perform a canine sniff….”).) Now on appeal, Mack
argues a new basis for suppression: that the stop was unlawfully extended when Cottrell asked
Caldwell about drugs prior to the dog sniff. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-14.) Because this claim is
raised for the first time on appeal, it is unpreserved and not properly before this Court.

10

In his brief, Mack broadly refers to this claim as one that was raised below, stating “Mack
claimed that Officer Cottrell unlawfully extended the stop by continuing to talk with the
occupants instead of verifying their identities and Mr. Caldwell’s driving status, or beginning the
citation process.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) To support this assertion, Mack cites to the affidavit
filed with his motion to suppress. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.5, 11-12, 12 n.4 (citing R., pp.61,
63).) However, the affidavit does not claim that Cottrell unlawfully extended the stop when he
asked Caldwell about drugs, as Mack now does on appeal; in fact, the affidavit does not even
reference that specific conversation. (See R., pp.61-63.) The affidavit asserts that “[i]nstead of
checking to see if Mr. Caldwell had valid driving privileges or any outstanding warrants, Officer
Cottrell continued to make small talk with [Mack],” not Caldwell. (R., p.63.) The following
section begins: “Next, Officer Cottrell produced a drug dog and ran it around the vehicle.” (R.,
p.63.) Notably missing is the conversation between Cottrell and Caldwell that forms the basis of
this newly raised claim. Mack concedes that “the district court did not address Mr. Mack’s
argument that Officer Cottrell had extended the traffic stop, prior to contacting dispatch, by
engaging in questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) Simply
put, the district court did not address the argument because it was not made. This new “horse” is
therefore not properly before this Court on appeal.
ii.

Cottrell’s Questions Did Not Unlawfully Prolong The Traffic Stop

“Brief inquiries not otherwise related to the initial purpose of the stop do not necessarily
violate a detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights.” State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 181, 90 P.3d 926,
931 (Ct. App. 2004). The United States Supreme Court has held that, “[b]eyond determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the
traffic] stop.’” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408
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(2005)). “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether
there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and
proof of insurance.” Id. “These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic
code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id.
However, Rodriguez “did not exhaustively define the scope of constitutionally acceptable
inquiries during a traffic stop.” State v. Hale, 2020 WL 2465744, at *3 (Idaho App., May 13,
2020) (holding that an officer could conduct “a reasonable inquiry” to verify nonowner-driver’s
claim that he had permission to drive the stopped vehicle); see State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 481,
362 P.3d 551, 556 (Ct. App. 2015) (concluding that officer’s inquiry into defendant’s apparent
nervousness was permissible); -see --also -----------State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128,
134 (Ct. App. 2008) (“Brief, general questions about drugs and weapons, in and of themselves,
do not extend an otherwise lawful detention.”). Nor does Rodriguez “prohibit all conduct that in
any way slows the officer from completing the stop as fast as humanly possible. It prohibits
abandoning the stop to investigate other crimes.” Still, 166 Idaho at ___, 458 P.3d at 225
(holding that officer’s ten-second call to request a drug dog was not an abandonment of the
traffic stop and therefore did not unlawfully prolong the stop).
Cottrell’s brief questions to Caldwell were permissible inquiries, not an abandonment of
the purpose of the stop. Cottrell stopped the vehicle for excessive window tint and following too
closely and, in furtherance of that purpose, requested Caldwell’s driver’s license as well as the
vehicle’s insurance and registration. (R., pp.110-11.) Once he had the documents in hand,
Cottrell engaged Caldwell in a brief conversation behind the vehicle, during which he discussed
the window tint and how closely Caldwell had been following a semi-truck. (R., p.111.) Then,
Cottrell asked Caldwell if there were any weapons or drugs in the vehicle, if anyone asked him to

12

transport anything besides the vehicle across state lines, why there were air fresheners in every
vent clip, and if a drug dog would alert to the vehicle. (R., p.112.) Cottrell continued to conduct
the traffic stop investigation; he called in the vehicle and occupants’ information to dispatch and
measured the tint on the vehicle’s windows. (R., p.112.) Later, Cottrell discussed the window
tint with Caldwell and let him know it was too dark under Idaho law. (See Ex., 17:44-17:55.)
Cottrell’s diligent pursuit of the traffic violations demonstrate that he did not abandon the
original purpose of the traffic stop to conduct a new investigation when he briefly asked Caldwell
general questions.
Mack asserts that the questions unlawfully extended the traffic stop, because they were
unrelated to roadway or officer safety and instead marked the beginning of Cottrell’s
investigation into possible drug trafficking. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.) First, the Idaho Court
of Appeals has recently made clear that inquiries need not relate only to roadway or officer safety
to be constitutionally permissible. ----See Hale, 2020 WL 2465744, at *3. In Hale, an officer
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle for failing to display license plates. Id. at *1. The driver,
Hale, indicated he was borrowing the vehicle and provided the owner’s address. Id. The officer
returned to his patrol vehicle to conduct driver’s checks and discovered that the vehicle owner’s
address was different from the one Hale provided. Id. The officer called the registered owner to
verify that Hale had permission to drive the vehicle. Id. On appeal, Hale argued that the officer
unlawfully prolonged the stop when he called the vehicle’s owner. Id. The Idaho Court of
Appeals concluded that the officer’s inquiry was reasonable and permissible under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at *3-4. The Court specifically “reject[ed] Hale’s assertion that the mission of a
traffic stop includes only those inquiries expressly identified in Rodriguez or inquiries that relate
to safety.” Id. at *4.
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Mack’s argument relies on the same faulty assertion—that Cottrell’s questions were
impermissible because they “were unrelated to the officer’s traffic mission, as they lacked any
connection to roadway safety or officer safety.” (Appellant’s brief, p.13.) Like the officer’s
inquiry in Hale, Cottrell’s questions were reasonable, even if unrelated to safety. Just as the
officer in Hale could reasonably inquire into the driver’s permission to operate a vehicle owned
by someone else, Cottrell could reasonable inquire whether the vehicle contained weapons or
contraband and whether Caldwell was asked to transport anything else across state lines, given
that Caldwell stated he did not own the vehicle and was transporting it from Washington to
Arkansas.

Similarly, Cottrell’s question about the air fresheners was reasonable, given his

observation of air fresheners in every vent and the strong odor emanating from the vehicle.
Second, the record demonstrates that Cottrell’s questions did not signal an abandonment
of the original purpose of the traffic stop. In Still, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “does not prohibit all conduct that in any way slows the officer
from completing the stop as fast as humanly possible.” Still, 166 Idaho at ___, 458 P.3d at 225.
The Court held that an officer’s radio call to inquire whether a drug dog was available was not an
abandonment, even though the officer was not simultaneously engaging in any other traffic stop
tasks during the ten seconds of the radio call. Id. Just as in Still, where the officer’s request for a
drug dog occurred before running checks on the vehicle occupants’ information and did not
constitute an abandonment, here Cottrell’s brief questions to Caldwell did not constitute an
abandonment of the original purpose of the traffic stop. Cottrell continued to investigate the
traffic violations, requesting that dispatch run checks on the vehicle and occupants and
measuring the window tint of the vehicle.

Mack has failed to show that Cottrell’s brief

questioning of Caldwell rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation.
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b.

The Dog Sniff Did Not Unlawfully Prolong The Traffic Stop

“Although a drug-dog sniff cannot fairly be characterized as part of the officer’s traffic
mission, it is well-established that a drug-dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop is
constitutionally permissible if it is executed in a reasonable manner and does not itself infringe
upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest.” McGraw, 163 Idaho at 739, 418 P.3d at 1248.
Where it is alleged that a dog sniff unlawfully prolongs a traffic stop, the critical question is not
whether the dog sniff occurs before or after a traffic ticket is issued, but whether the dog sniff
adds time to the traffic stop. Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154 (citing Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 357). “The United States Supreme Court is careful to couch its opinion in the ‘adds time
to’ framework. It does this in order to allow for dog sniffs that do not add time to the stop[.]” Id.
at n.1; see McGraw, 163 Idaho at 740-41, 418 P.3d at 1249-50 (holding that a dog sniff did not
prolong the traffic stop where a second officer continued issuing the traffic citation while the first
officer conducted the dog sniff).
In State v. Renteria, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that an officer did not unlawfully
extend a traffic stop when his actions related to drug investigation occurred simultaneously with
the traffic stop. 163 Idaho 545, 548-49, 415 P.3d 954, 957-58 (Ct. App. 2018). The Court held
that the officer did not unlawfully extend the stop when he asked Renteria about drugs because
the Renteria was in the process of searching for his proof of insurance at the time. Id. Nor did
the officer unlawfully extend the stop when he requested the assistance of a canine officer
because he was walking to his patrol vehicle to generate a traffic citation when he did so. Id. at
549, 415 P.3d at 958. Likewise, the officer did not unlawfully extend the stop when he discussed
his suspicions of drug activity with the canine officer. Id. The officer had called in the vehicle
occupants’ information to dispatch and, when the conversation took place, the officer “was still
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in his patrol car awaiting a response from dispatch as to the validity of Renteria’s driving
privileges and as to whether there were any outstanding warrants for Renteria or his passenger.”
Id. “Because dispatch still had not confirmed Renteria’s valid driving privileges or responded
about whether Renteria or his passenger had any outstanding warrants, the conversation between
Trooper Sproat and the canine officer did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop.” Id.
Like the officer in Renteria, Cottrell did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop when he
conducted the dog sniff while waiting for a response from dispatch. The district court found and
the record shows that Cottrell called in Caldwell and Mack’s information to dispatch. (R., p.112;
Tr., p.11, Ls.21-23; Ex., 11:45-13:33.) Cottrell then conducted the drug dog sniff as he waited
for a response from dispatch. (R., p.112; ex., 13:35-14:40.) Cottrell “had not received a return
from dispatch when the dog was deployed and gave an active alert indication.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.19; R., p.112.) As the district court found, Cottrell “performed the entire sniff while he was
waiting for a return from dispatch.” (R., p. 117.) “Because dispatch still had not confirmed
[Caldwell]’s valid driving privileges or responded about whether [Caldwell or Mack] had any
outstanding warrants,” the drug dog sniff did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop.

See

Renteria, 163 Idaho at 549, 415 P.3d at 958.
Mack argues that the dog sniff unlawfully extended the traffic stop because Cottrell never
received a return from dispatch. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-16.) Mack challenges the district
court’s finding that Cottrell checked on the status of the return after conducting the dog sniff and
received a response from dispatch. (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-16 (citing R., p.112).) However,
that factual finding is irrelevant to the analysis on this issue in light of the undisputed facts.
Mack agrees that Cottrell called in the information to dispatch. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)
Mack also agrees that Cottrell had not yet received a response from dispatch at the time he
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conducted the dog sniff and the dog alerted.

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.) Therefore, Cottrell

conducted the dog sniff while waiting for a response from dispatch and did not prolong the traffic
stop in order to do so. Whether Cottrell checked on the status of the return or received a
response from dispatch after the dog alerted is of no moment—once the dog alerted, Cottrell had
probable cause to search the vehicle for the presence of drugs. See State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho
703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012) (“A reliable drug dog’s alert on the exterior of a vehicle is
sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the interior.”).

2.

Even If Cottrell Did Prolong The Traffic Stop, The Extension Was Justified By
Independent Reasonable Suspicion

“[T]he justification for the detention of a motorist is not permanently fixed at the moment
the traffic stop is initiated.” State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183, 125 P.3d 536, 539 (Ct.
App. 2005).

“Subsequent observations and events can give rise to legitimate reasons for

investigation of criminality differing from that which initially prompted the stop.” Renteria, 163
Idaho at 550, 415 P.3d at 959.

“[A]ny routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious

circumstances, which could justify an officer asking questions unrelated to the stop.

The

officer’s observations, general inquiries, and events succeeding the stop may—and often do—
give rise to legitimate reasons for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an
officer.” State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). “If officers
acquire reasonable suspicion of other crimes during the course of a traffic investigation . . . they
may investigate those crimes.” Renteria, 163 Idaho at 550, 415 P.3d at 959.
Evidence sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion is “less than that necessary to
establish probable cause” but requires “more than a mere hunch.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho
804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).

Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific,
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articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Id. Whether an
officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances
known to the officer. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
“[A]n officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his possession, and those
inferences may be informed by the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.” State v.
Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
In determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, this Court “considers the
totality of the circumstances rather than viewing individual facts in isolation.” State v. Kelley,
159 Idaho 417, 424, 361 P.3d 1280, 1287 (Ct. App. 2015). “Even where any individual factor ‘is
not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent with innocent’ conduct, a court
may nonetheless conclude that the factors amount to reasonable suspicion when taken together.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1989)). “[T]he existence of alternative
innocent explanations of the circumstances does not negate the facts that the officer had
reasonable suspicion that a crime might have been committed.” State v. Rader, 135 Idaho 273,
276, 16 P.3d 949, 952 (Ct. App. 2000).
Cottrell testified to the specific, articulable facts that raised his suspicion that drug
activity was afoot, and to the reasonable inferences he drew from those facts, based on his
experience and training in law enforcement. Those facts include: the vehicle had Alaska plates,
was being driven by someone with an Arkansas driver’s license, was travelling from a source
state along a high-drug trafficking interstate, the vehicle did not belong to either of the occupants,
Caldwell said he had the vehicle’s documents in hand earlier that day, Mack recently moved to
Washington but was already travelling back to Arkansas, Caldwell had a large wad of cash in his
wallet, there were air fresheners in every vent emitting a strong odor, there was a suitcase with an
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airline tag in the backseat, Caldwell seemed evasive, and Mack seemed nervous. (See R., p.119.)
The district court properly concluded that Cottrell “became aware of specific, articulable facts
and information that provided him with independent reasonable suspicion to perform the exterior
canine sniff.” (R., pp.117-19.)
Cottrell became aware that the vehicle bore Alaska plates, was driven by Caldwell who
possessed an Arkansas driver’s license, and was travelling from Washington state to Arkansas.
(R., pp.110-11.) Cottrell testified that Interstate 84 in Canyon County—where he conducted the
traffic stop in this case—has been federally designated a High Interstate Drug Trafficking Area
because the area is noted for drug trafficking and apprehension. (Tr., p.6, L.19 – p.7, L.3.) He
also testified that Washington is a source state for marijuana. (Tr., p.16, Ls.16-19.)
Cottrell learned that the vehicle did not belong to either Caldwell or Mack. (R., pp.111.)
Cottrell testified that this fact was significant based on his experience, because a “third-party
vehicle” is oftentimes used in the drug industry to avoid civil forfeitures—“the vehicle not being
able to be seized because it doesn’t belong to anybody directly there on the scene with the
crime.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.6-15.) This fact contributed to Cottrell’s reasonable suspicion. See
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d at 135 (that “neither of the truck’s occupants owned the
vehicle” contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion).
Cottrell heard Caldwell state he had the vehicle’s registration and insurance in hand
earlier that day. (R., p.111; Tr., p.22, L.25 – p.23, L.10.) Cottrell testified that, in his experience,
this is “irregular for the normal motoring public” but consistent with the drug trafficking
industry, where individuals “make sure they have the documents in hand to reduce the chances of
being stopped and…to reduce that time that the officer’s at the door.” (Tr., p.23, Ls.6-10.)
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Cottrell heard Mack state he recently moved to Tacoma, Washington, but was already
making a trip back to Arkansas. (R., p.111; Tr., p.23, Ls.18-20.) Cottrell testified that this fact
was significant based on his experience, because “oftentimes, drug trafficking organizations will
plant people into either a source state or a neutral state to be able to set up a back and forth easier
and less recognizable…way of getting back and forth and getting their contraband.” (Tr., p.23,
L.20 – p.24, L.5.)
Cottrell saw that Caldwell was carrying a large wad of cash in his wallet. (R., p.111; Tr.,
p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.2.) Cottrell testified that carrying a large quantity of cash is “consistent with
what [he’s] seen in the drug trafficking industry.”

(Tr., p.11, Ls.4-5.)

He testified that

individuals in the drug trafficking industry commonly use cash “because it doesn’t leave as good
of a paper trail” as compared to credit cards. (Tr., p.17, Ls.13-17.)
Cottrell saw air fresheners in every vent in the front of the vehicle and smelled a strong
odor. (R., p.110; Tr., p.12, Ls.18-21.) Cottrell found the air fresheners significant because “it
was clear from looking at the vent clips that they had just been put there,” and “the quantity of air
fresheners in the vehicle to create an abundance of what would potentially be considered a cover
odor or an odor to cover something—some other odor in the vehicle.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.12-22.)
That fact contributed to Cottrell’s reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Rojas-Millan, 234
F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2000) ( “unusually strong odor of perfume” in vehicle contributed to
reasonable suspicion because officer suspected based on his training that “the perfume was
intended to mask the smell of illegal drugs”); see
also State
- --- - -v.
- -Brumfield,
- - - - - - 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42
P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001) (defendant “excessively” puffing on cigar contributed to
reasonable suspicion because “[t]he officer knew from training and experience that cigar smoke
was sometimes used to mask the odor of drugs”).
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Cottrell learned that Mack and Caldwell had flown one-way to Washington and he
observed a suitcase with an airline tag in the backseat of the vehicle. (R., p.110; Tr., p.22, Ls.2023.) Cottrell testified that it was consistent with the drug trafficking industry to fly one-way to a
location and drive back. (Tr., p.22, Ls.20-23.) Additionally, he testified that the luggage in the
backseat drew his attention and prompted him to question what was in the vehicle’s trunk. (Tr.,
p.40, Ls.9-15.)
Cottrell testified that Caldwell seemed evasive and Mack seemed nervous. (R., p.111;
Tr., p.8, L.25 – p.9, L.1; p.10, Ls.2-8.) Cottrell testified that Mack engaged him in conversation,
asked how his day was, and offered his identification. (R., p.111; Tr., p.10, Ls.2-8.) In Cottrell’s
experience, this was an indicator of nervousness. (Tr., p.52, L.19 – p.53, L.3.) He testified that
“a high percentage of the time” he has an interaction with someone like his interaction with
Mack, it “comes out to be criminal behavior.” (Tr., p.53, Ls.14-17.) This observed behavior also
contributed to Cottrell’s reasonable suspicion. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct.
577, 587-88 (2018) (noting that nervous and evasive behavior can be taken into account and
contribute to an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity).
These specific, articulable facts, viewed objectively in light of the reasonable inference
Cottrell drew from his training and experience, were sufficient to give rise to independent
reasonable suspicion of drug activity.

6

Thus, even if Cottrell extended the traffic stop to ask

6

Cottrell also testified that Caldwell’s demeanor appeared to change when Cottrell mentioned
that he had a drug dog. Cottrell testified that he observed “a distinct and noticeable change of
behavior”—Caldwell’s eyes widened, he appeared concerned, and he struggled to answer when
Cottrell asked if the drug dog would alert to anything in the vehicle. (Tr., p.13, Ls.7-12.) If this
Court determines that Cottrell’s questions to Caldwell did not constitute an extension of the stop,
this factor can also be considered in the totality of circumstances. See Grantham, 146 Idaho at
497, 198 P.3d at 135 (defendant’s visible change of demeanor when asked whether there was
methamphetamine in the vehicle contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion).
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Caldwell questions or conduct the dog sniff, that extension was justified by reasonable suspicion
and was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Mack argues that “none of the facts taken alone have significance in the reasonable
suspicion analysis” and attacks each fact individually.

(See Appellant’s brief, pp.19-24.)

However, “[t]he totality-of-the-circumstances test precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer
analysis.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court cannot
“dismiss outright any circumstances that [a]re susceptible of innocent explanation.”

Id.

(quotation marks and citation omitted). That Mack can propose an innocent explanation for each
fact does not diminish the totality of the facts and circumstances Cottrell became aware of and
the reasonable inferences that he drew from those facts based on his training and experience.
“While each of these reasons alone could appear innocent, all of [Corporal Cottrell]’s
observations, considered together, and including his training and experience, give rise to
reasonable suspicion sufficient to expand the scope of the traffic stop.” See Grantham, 146 Idaho
at 497, 198 P.3d at 135.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s denial of Mack’s
motion to suppress.
DATED this 15th day of June, 2020.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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